suffer until she dies from natural causes. The choice is cruel." 3 The Court specified that the scope of the judgment was only intended to respond to the circumstances of the case. It made no specific pronouncement about the status of mental disorders in the context of assisted dying, and provided no additional guidance on the relationship between the legal and medical concepts of mental disorders. Since Carter, the landscape of assisted dying in Canada has evolved considerably, and whether to permit assisted dying for suffering due to mental disorders alone has been hotly contested.
The Parliamentary Special Joint Committee on Physician Assisted Dying advised that the "grievous and irremediable" criterion should not exclude non-terminal medical conditions, including mental disorders. 4 However, Federal Bill C-14, which was passed by Parliament this year, does not accommodate assisted dying for mental disorders alone. The federal assisted dying law defines patients with suffering from a grievous and irremediable condition as those who are
(1) in an advanced state of irreversible decline with (2) a reasonably foreseeable natural death from (3) a serious or incurable illness, disease, or disability that (4) causes enduring and intolerable physical or psychological suffering that cannot be relieved under conditions that they find acceptable. 5 While the presence of comorbid mental disorders is not a bar to assisted dying when these criteria are met, the requirements for severity, incurability, intolerability and proximity to end of life have the likely combined effect of precluding access by patients whose suffering is solely related to a mental disorder. . 5 An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts (medical assistance in dying). S.C. 2016, c.3, 241.2(2). 6 Medical Assistance in Dying. Government of Canada. Published online Dec, 2016. Advocates for assisted dying for mental disorders often cite the principles of autonomy, freedom of self-determination, and respect for human dignity as core values in support of their position. There is no doubt that the process of assisted dying is more humane and compassionate than the unreliable, traumatic, and often violent options that are otherwise available to people with mental disorders who express a desire to die. 7 However, these urgent calls to relieve mental suffering through assisted dying must be tempered by caution because the stakes are high, and retrospective solutions to problems created by a hastily assembled system are unacceptable.
From the ethical and moral perspectives of both medicine and the law, it is prudent to be wary of an approach that emphasizes autonomy and individualism at the expense of some of the most vulnerable and stigmatized members of society.
Critics of the federal law disagree that its criteria preclude mental disorders, noting that the psychological suffering caused by mental disorders is no less important or intolerable than any other suffering, and that mental illness is often incurable and can indeed lead to death. 8 For example, dementia and anorexia nervosa are both chronic conditions, where the inevitable result of dementia is death, and some patients have in fact died in severe cases of anorexia. Critics argue further that the presence of such a mental disorder does not necessarily preclude the ability to make medical decisions. 9 However, by the time patients reach the advanced stages of disease where death becomes reasonably foreseeable, the associated cognitive changes clearly impair decision-making capacity. This in turn calls into question the underlying validity of providing assisted dying in such contexts.
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These are not simply theoretical concerns. Evidence from the medical literature and the international experience suggests that there should be serious concerns about the implementation of assisted dying for mental disorders. 10 Psychiatric illnesses are importantly different from the terminal physical conditions with respect to which Carter was decided, and the issues they raise deserve careful consideration. Importantly, mental disorders can strongly influence the perception of suffering and impair the capacity to make decisions. Judgements that rely too heavily on the expertise of physicians and individual clinical evaluations may be inadequate safeguards. The nature of mental disorders makes capacity assessments particularly challenging, because they can affect the rational and emotional thought processes that influence decisionmaking. Negative emotions and social isolation can fuel a downward spiral of hopelessness that impairs psychological resilience until even routine tasks seem overwhelming. Moreover, the right to refuse treatment, and the inherent unpredictability of the course of mental illness and potential response to treatment make the threshold for intractability unclear. Furthermore, research has repeatedly demonstrated that informed consent practices are frequently inadequate, often missing essential components, such as confirming the patient's understanding of their condition or the risks and benefits of treatment.
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The international experience demonstrates that these challenges have led to concerning trends of permissive incrementalism, where the use of assisted dying for mental disorders has gradually expanded in scope to include patients with advanced dementia, which is characterized by severe neurocognitive impairment, and personality disorders, whose decisions making abilities are complicated by extreme emotional reactivity to environmental and interpersonal on its own, their cumulative effect raises serious concerns about the use of assisted dying for mental disorders. Law makers, in cooperation with physicians, must put in place limitations to ensure that assisted dying is available to those who need it, but also that it is never used inappropriately. However, suffering is an inherently subjective and personal experience, and while we strive to be empathetic and compassionate, we can never fully appreciate the suffering experienced by another person. Therein lies the ultimate contention.
III. Mental disorders affect thought processes, decision-making and perception of suffering
The assisted dying debate necessarily focuses on the definition of "intolerable" and "irremediable" suffering, and typically approaches these concepts from the perspective of medical treatment failure. However, the subjectivity of the experience and the relationship between mental disorders and resilience reveal that other important inputs, such as emotional states, social conditions, and patient expectations, modulate the perception of suffering and influence decision-making. This understanding helps to inform the specific concerns around assisted dying for mental disorders.
While it is conceptually convenient to distinguish between physical and psychological suffering when discussing assisted dying, these two entitles are clearly linked by the common physiological processes and psychological underpinnings that influence the perception of The emotional components of pain that are often equated with suffering and modulate its experience are often more important than the signal itself. 15 The centres of the brain that process emotions and respond to social rejection are also responsible for regulating physical pain, while serotonin, the neurotransmitter that is deficient in depression, influences the emotional response to pain. 16 Indeed, research suggests that depression causes pain at least as often as pain causes depression. 17 Moreover, depression is known to exacerbate physical pain 18 and treating depression can improve or even eliminate the associated pain. 19 Given the link between emotional processing and the perception of pain, it is unsurprising that the degree of suffering does not necessarily correlate with the extent of physical or psychological trauma. 20 Indeed, how a person perceives pain and suffering depends, in large part, on context. 21 Emotional states, such as fear, anxiety, and uncertainty exacerbate physical pain and the perception of suffering.
Importantly, these emotional states are characteristically displayed by patients with mental disorders, such as depression, for which assisted dying is often proposed. Moreover, comorbid medical conditions and issues related to psychological, legal and social factors influence the perception of suffering and the emotional capacity for resilience.
25
In medicine, the failure of the health care system to protect individuals from harm when the intent is to help is colloquially described as "falling through the cracks." With respect to assisted dying, failure to consider the impact of social factors and the effect of emotional changes caused by a mental disorder on a patient's thought processes, rational decision-making abilities, and perception of "intolerable" suffering effectively substitutes the "crack" for a "chasm" into which countless patients are likely to vanish. Before concluding that suffering is intolerable and irremediable, deliberate attention must be paid to the non-medical factors that contribute to the 22 experience. A therapeutic approach that is conscious of the influence of psychosocial factors on the perception of suffering has the potential to restore quality of life and reduce the need for assisted dying overall.
IV. Definitions of "mental disorder" offer little guidance on where to draw the line
As the Court in Carter did not explicitly address mental disorders, the subsequent debate about access to assisted dying for mental disorders lacks the benefit of a uniform legal definition.
Across Canada, the variation in statutory definitions of "mental disorder" raise questions about the comparative understanding of mental illness from legal and medical perspectives. Surveying the various provincial mental health acts reveals that the legal definition of "mental disorder" differs considerably depending on the jurisdiction. For example, Alberta recognizes a connection between mental disorders and impaired capacity, where "mental disorder" means "any substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation or memory that grossly impairs:
judgment, behaviour, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life." 26 The definition in British Columbia is similar, but less specific. In that province, a mental disorder is defined as "seriously impair[ing] the person's ability (a) to react appropriately to the person's environment, or (b) to associate with others." 27 Conversely, Ontario defines mental disorder simply as "a disease or disability of the mind," which is unhelpful in its breadth.
28
Unfortunately, the Criminal Code of Canada presents a similarly broad definition, although its application is narrowly confined to the accused's understanding of right and wrong as it relates to the defense of "not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder." These various statutory definitions through which mental disorders attract special legal attention provide little guidance for determining the appropriate boundaries that would apply if assisted dying is permitted for mental disorders. Moreover, in some circumstances, the criteria that give legal effect to a mental disorder, such as those in Alberta, reflect impairments of the fundamental requirements for a patient to be deemed capable of making treatment decisions.
This apparent discord necessitates more clearly articulated and harmonious legal concepts of mental disorders across jurisdictions, and of capacity in the context of mental illness, which can be a complex endeavor. If assisted dying is allowed for mental disorders strictly based on these legal definitions, application in Ontario would be very broad, while those in Alberta would
arguably not qualify based on incapacity. Such unequal treatment under the law would clearly be unacceptable. In practice, legal definitions are necessarily informed by medical assessments and the judgment of practitioners who operate with a different and more nuanced understanding of mental illness. Indeed, the Court in Carter placed considerable emphasis on the expertise of physicians, and medical practitioners operating within the constraints of legal criteria will necessarily guide the application and evolution of assisted dying. However, if criteria for proximity to end of life are removed, and assisted dying is to be permitted for mental disorders, it is unclear where to draw the line.
V. Collective experience suggests that the slope is slippery
Some form of assisted dying is now legal in Canada, several European countries, and seven US states, with a further 26 states set to consider assisted dying in the coming year.
30
While laws in Canada and the US limit assisted dying to patients near the end of life, some
European countries, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, have enacted more permissive assisted dying regimes that include patients who suffer solely from mental disorders.
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While the Court in Carter was presented with evidence that "[o]nce euthanasia is allowed, it becomes very difficult to maintain a strict interpretation of the statutory conditions," 32 the Court was unconvinced that a "slippery slope" would develop in Canada. In the Court's view, countries that had permitted assisted dying had successfully instituted safeguards to protect vulnerable populations. Moreover, the Court emphasized its confidence in the judgment of individual physicians to ensure that no person who is ineligible for assisted dying would receive it. However, the response in Canada since Carter and the cumulative international experience suggest that incremental changes in accepted societal norms, public opinion, and physician practice patterns threaten to expand the scope of assisted dying beyond the Court's contemplation.
There have been several unexpected developments in the short time since Carter was decided and the subsequent federal legislation was enacted. The demand for and use of assisted dying in Canada has already exceeded initial projections. In Quebec, which preempted the Supreme Court with its own provincial assisted dying law in 2014, government forecasts
suggested that approximately 100 patients would obtain assisted dying in the first year.
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However, as of December 2016, 461 patients had received assisted dying, which is over four and a half times the number that was initially estimated. 34 Moreover, the scope of the discussion has expanded well beyond the terminal physical illness context in which the case was argued. recommended a much more permissive regime that would allow access to assisted dying for mental disorders and mature minors, neither of which were directly addressed in the judgment.
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Some critics of the federal legislation have even argued that the new law "falls below the bare minimum" required by the Court. 36 In light of this commentary, it is clear that the boundaries of Canada's new assisted dying law will be challenged. It has never been a question of whether this would happen, but only when.
Even before end of the suspension period set by the Supreme Court, Canadians with mental illness voiced their intent to seek assisted dying. 37 Indeed, in 2016, the Alberta Court of Appeal unanimously approved the assisted dying request for a woman suffering from conversion disorder, a non-terminal mental disorder that causes unexplained physical symptoms. 38 In its judgment, the court distinguished between the psychological and physical experience of suffering, emphasizing that the physical pain caused by the patient's mental disorder was distinct from the psychological and emotional suffering seen in other mental disorders, like depression.
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These developments following Carter, and the international experience with assisted dying for mental disorders, raise doubts about the Court's confidence in cultural factors and medical judgment as effective safeguards.
VI. The law relies on physicians as gatekeepers to protect the vulnerable
Advocates for assisted dying in the context of mental disorders often assume that physician judgment is an adequate safeguard for protecting vulnerable patients. dying for mental disorders were withdrawn. 54 At the crux of this issue is the difficult clinical delineation between suicidal ideation and a desire for an assisted death that reflects both valid consent for assisted dying and meets the criteria at law. Since suicidal ideation is considered by the medical community to be a temporary irrational state rather than an unchanging rational response to an unendurable situation, it becomes an imperative for consent to be able to distinguish between these two circumstances. While obligatory waiting periods and routine reevaluation intervals have been proposed as potential solutions, this finding raises doubts about whether the suffering experienced by patients who have received assisted dying was truly irremediable according to current Canadian law.
There is growing acceptance among physicians that the prospect of psychological "death" before physical death can be intolerable. Evidence from the Netherlands also suggests that a cultural shift in physician attitudes in favour of assisted dying for mental disorders, and corresponding changes in practice patterns may have the effect of creating a more permissive regime over time. Requests related to neurocognitive disorders, such as dementia, present particular difficulties because the patient's progressive decline inevitably impairs the ability to make decisions. This raises obvious concerns about whether such patients can qualify because of the inherent challenges of assessing capacity in dementia, such as the fluctuating effect on cognition and lucidity, and the phenomenon of confabulation, through which patients can project 
VIII. Capacity assessments in practice are less reliable than assumed
Capacity to make decisions is a fundamental concept in both medicine and law, and critically important in the context of assisted dying. 62 To consent to treatment, a person must be capable of understanding the relevant information and appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their decision. 63 Capacity is generally presumed unless there are reasonable circumstances to suggest otherwise. 64 Canadian law does not accept global assessments of decision-making capacity, but rather approaches capacity as a mutable quality related to the specific activity in question at the specific time of assessment. 65 This makes the task of practitioners challenging, because not all decisions require the same degree of capacity, and capacity can change over time. A patient may lack capacity for one decision, but be competent for another, and their status with respect to either decision may fluctuate depending on when it is assessed. 66 This means that determining whether a patient has the capacity to refuse treatment and the capacity to consent to assisted dying need to be assessed independently because they do not necessarily have the same answer. However, the practical means by which physicians commonly determine capacity suggests that these questions are often not separated.
How capacity is assessed in practice varies among physicians, and the subjectivity introduced by clinical judgment and biases can lead to different determinations in the same case.
The general assumption by courts is that doctors can accurately determine medical futility and decisional capacity in the context of mental disorders, with the implication that no ineligible person would receive assisted dying. However, in practice, the assessments in which assisted dying advocates and courts put their faith are highly subjective and lack rigorous thresholds. reflect capacity as it relates to a specific decision at a specific time, which is not consistent with either best practices or Canadian legal requirements. In the wake of legalized assisted dying, palliative care specialists have begun to respond to this concern by adopting alternative assessment tools that better capture the patient's understanding of the specific decision at hand, such as the Aid to Capacity Evaluation. 74 However, none of these objective assessment tools examine emotional capacity, a factor that has important influence on the "intolerability" of suffering, the reasonableness of thought processes, and the clarity of decision-making. In order to
give effect to the Court's confidence in physician expertise as the primary protection against the misuse of assisted dying for mental disorders, the medical community must be thoroughly educated on the legal requirements and optimum tools for capacity assessments to create a lasting cultural shift in physician practices.
Retrospective reports from Belgium and the Netherlands reveal that most assessments for assisted dying for mental disorders have been expressed as a global determination without objective evidence, raising questions about the rigor of assessment and application of strict criteria. 75 While the presence of a mental disorder is not evidence of incapacity, some patients who request assisted dying for a mental illness will obviously fail to meet the requirements, such as patients with active psychosis. 76 However, there are many conditions that increase the risk of incapacity, such as depression, intellectual disability, and dementia, but their effect on decisionmaking may not be readily apparent.
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Despite the availability of objective assessments, physicians in practice typically determine capacity using a clinical gestalt assessment, which is both highly subjective and 74 Aid to Capacity Evaltion (ACE). Joint Centre for Bioethics. University of Toronto. 2016. 75 Lemmens, supra note 68. 76 Price A. Mental capacity as a safeguard in assisted dying: Clar-ity is needed. BMJ 2015;351:h4461. 77 Lemmens, supra note 68.
variable. Indeed, such individual clinical judgment is supported by the language of provincial health statutes and the federal assisted dying law. 78 Subsequent guidance from medical regulatory authorities simply affirms that the criteria for capacity remain unchanged in the context of assisted dying. 79 Clinical judgment supports the values of respect for individuality and patient centered care, and has the potential benefit of examining emotional capacity, but it strongly favours subjective opinion over objective measures, which leads to unacceptable variability, especially in difficult cases.
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While psychiatrists are arguably the best equipped to reliably assess capacity in the context of mental disorders, the international experience with the use of clinical expertise to adjudicate requests for assisted dying for mental illness is troubling. For example, in the Netherlands, a panel of three independent physician reviewers disagreed about whether the patient was competent in one quarter of requests for assisted dying due to a mental disorder.
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This brings into question the reliability of the Canadian model, which readily accepts the opinion of individual physicians. In addition, it is uncertain how accurately a non-psychiatrist, and therefore non-specialist physician can assess the intractability of a mental disorder. General medical training pays little attention to the methods and skills for determining capacity.
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General practitioners, who are presently the primary means of accessing assisted dying in Canada, receive little more than basic instruction in general capacity assessments, and even less in the context of mental disorders. 83 Moreover, they may have quite different views on whether a 78 Ontario's Mental Health Act and Health Care Consent Act, and Federal Bill C-14 all refer to whether a patient meets criteria "in the opinion of" the attending physician. 79 Furthermore, most assisted dying access in Canada is facilitated through family physicians, and the doctor performing assisted dying is unlikely to have had a previous treatment relationship with the patient given the relatively small number of providers. 85 The practicalities of access mean, somewhat ironically, that the physicians with the least expertise and shortest therapeutic relationship with the patient are empowered to implement the law and adjudicate requests. This dissociation of expertise in assisted dying and expertise in capacity assessments in the context of mental disorders is clearly problematic. In addition, the vague legal criteria for capacity assessments that inherently rely on individual clinical judgment, and the finality of assisted dying make it challenging to hold doctors accountable for poor quality assessments.
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IX. Informed consent practices are inadequate in general
Decision-making capacity is a precondition to informed consent, which has a prominent role in assisted dying because of the serious and irrevocable nature of the act. physicians that standard consent procedures apply for assisted dying. 88 The conversation may remain largely unchanged when the goal is to hasten the foreseeable death of a person who is terminally ill and facing inevitable physical decline. However, it is conceptually more difficult to reconcile the expected benefit of premature death with the case of a patient who is physically well, but is struggling with a mental disorder.
The inverse intentions and finality of assisted dying make the conversation fundamentally 92 Given that capacity necessarily depends on the ability to understand, assess and rationally weigh the facts and consequences, the lack of patient understanding about the intervention raises the question of whether capacity was adequately assessed by clinicians at the time of consent. While such errors are concerning for the adequacy of consent in general, they are unacceptable in the context of assisted dying given the finality of the decision.
X. The right to refuse treatment is problematic in the context of mental disorders
The Court in Carter qualified its use of the word "irremediable" as not requiring a patient to undergo any "treatments that are not acceptable to the individual." 93 This caveat supports the general principle of autonomy, and makes sense from the perspective of a terminally ill patient who declines to undergo a treatment that trades quality of life for a short extension of life.
Indeed, this is often a point of discussion in end of life care. However, the right to refuse treatment presents problems in the context of mental disorders. "Irremediable" does not simply mean that the condition must be chronic or incurable, but also suggests no prospect of Appeal had no trouble granting a request for assisted dying by a person with a conversion disorder even though the psychiatrist who supported the request had never met the applicant.
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Questions about the severity of illness and thoroughness of the evaluation raise obvious concerns about the wisdom of relying on physicians as the key safeguard for assisted dying.
XII. Poor access to mental health care puts vulnerable patients at risk
Whether a mental disorder is irremediable is often viewed from a medical treatment perspective alone. However, social determinants of health importantly influence the degree of suffering associated with a mental disorder, but these are often inadequately addressed and sometimes not considered at all. 99 A permissive regime that allows assisted dying for mental disorders is not only premature, but puts a large category of marginalised and stigmatized people at risk. 100 Patients with mental disorders are vulnerable, not only because of their conditions, but also because of the poor socioeconomic conditions that often accompany psychiatric illness. loneliness as important contributing factors. 101 It is interesting that these aspects were specifically noted in the physicians' reports, because neither social isolation nor loneliness are convincingly incurable states.
Central to the issue of the remediation of mental disorders is access to care. Remediation is only possible if these services exist and are fully embedded into a patient-centered therapeutic regime. However, it is well established that the provision of mental health care and social supports for Canadians with mental disorders are inadequate and inequitable. Access, continuity and quality exhibit significant geographic variation, and are poorly integrated with the remainder of the health system. 102 These failings of our mental health system contribute to and perpetuate the vulnerability of patients with mental disorders. The focus on tertiary care in Canada has led to a system of revolving door psychiatric care where some patients who are suffering from an acute mental health crisis are briefly stabilized in hospital, then discharged to communities that lack the resources to meet their needs. Patients who do not have adequate supports but require frequent care often have no other option but to visit local emergency departments when they inevitably decompensate. Rather than being greeted with care or compassion, their frequent presentations are often met with a collective sigh of frustration and attitude of dismissal, which diminishes the patient's feelings of self-worth during a time of need, and further marginalizes an already vulnerable and stigmatized group.
The poor state of our mental health system has eroded the core values of empathy and compassion that define medicine. We must be particularly cautious from this perspective, because the ability to empathize and be compassionate toward those with mental disorders is 101 Kim, supra note 10.
necessary for physicians to fulfill the duty entrusted to them as gatekeepers of assisted dying. It is unwise to enact a policy that permits assisted dying for mental disorders before providing adequate basic support services for patients with mental disorders, because in doing so we risk substituting assisted dying for effective psychosocial and medical intervention.
XII. Conclusion
Assisted dying in Canada is in its infancy. It has been just a year since the declaration from Carter came into effect, and a federal law was crafted to fill the void. However, critics of the federal assisted dying law argue that it is too restrictive, and that assisted dying should be permitted for suffering due to mental disorders. Advocates argue that the core values of autonomy, freedom of self-determination, and respect for human dignity at the core of the Carter judgment apply equally to mental and physical disorders, and that it is the intractable and intolerable nature of the suffering itself that is important, rather than the source. Indeed, the clear interdependency between physical and mental suffering makes them impossible to separate.
However, patients with mental disorders are a stigmatized and vulnerable group, and we must be careful not to let individual autonomy interests eclipse societal interests in protecting them from harm and exploitation.
The typical counterargument is that safeguards can be put in place to ensure that no ineligible patient receives assisted dying. Central to this belief are faith in the clinical judgment of physicians and their expertise in determining medical futility and capacity for decisionmaking. However, evidence suggests that this may not be the case and that there should be serious concerns about the use of assisted dying for mental disorders. In countries where assisted dying has been legal for many years, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, there has been a concerning trend of permissive incrementalism that some consider has gone too far. 103 Moreover, the general reliance on physician expertise and judgment as the primary safeguard appears insufficient, and may put patients with mental disorders at greater risk. Indeed, there is evidence of a cultural shift in physician attitudes in favour of assisted dying for certain mental disorders, such as dementia, with corresponding increases in its use.
Assisted dying in the context of mental disorders presents numerous clinical, ethical and legal challenges, many of which are novel. The potential effects that mental disorders can have on decision-making abilities, the lack of proximity to end of life, the inherent difficulty in determining whether a mental disorder is irremediable, the right to refuse other treatment options, the lack of rigorous and reliable capacity assessments, the difficulty of detecting and holding physicians accountable for inadequate assessment, the varied legal definitions of mental disorders, and the suboptimal state of the Canadian mental health system represent many interrelated problems that require resolution before assisted dying for mental illness could be reliably and ethically implemented. Many of these factors relate to deeper, fundamental problems with care for mental health, which demand attention in their own right. While each is concerning on its own, their cumulative effect raises serious concerns about the use of assisted dying for mental disorders.
